Sports Card Blogs

The Arab World: towards bi-polarity?

It has been four years since the Arab Revolt was ignited and the
resulting social upheaval has all but left the region in tatters. From Egypt to Syria and Iraq, it appears that the old elites in these
countries are unable to remain in power without substantial international support.
Beset by social unrest and the rise of violent non-state actors, some of these
states have lost their ability to act autonomously in the international arena. They
have becomes proxies to other regional powers, most notably Saudi Arabia and
Iran, as they expand their quest for regional dominance.

US Secretary of State with King Salman of Saudi Arabia. Demotix Live News/Demotix. All rights reserved.

Thus, the multi-polar nature of the regional order has steadily shifted
towards bi-polarity, with Saudi Arabia acting as one regional super power, forming
a coalition of Sunni conservative regimes, and Iran acting as the other,
forming a coalition of Shia proxies. The powers of Egypt, Syria and Iraq – the
traditional contenders for leadership – have all but evaporated, as their ruling
elites rely on their patrons to maintain their flimsy grip on power.

Kenneth Waltz, one of the most celebrated International Relations
theorists, argued in “The Theory of
International Politics” that the behavior of states in an international
system depends on the distribution of power within that system.

A system that has more than one major power is called a multi-polar
system, which is considered unstable. While a system that has only two major
powers is a bi-polar system, considered the most stable. Recently, under pax
Americana, the age of a sole super power has emerged and the stability of this
uni-polar world is still being widely debated.

Waltz goes on to argue that the reasons behind the stability of a
bi-polar system is the ability of the two powers to control their junior
partners, so that no junior partner can jeopardize a full scale war by dragging
the major powers into an undesired confrontation – the dynamic of World War I
is cited as an example. There is also less uncertainty in this system and the
threat of war can be averted, since there are only two major powers communicating
– European peace during the Cold War is cited in support of this hypothesis.  

This is the theory, but how does this apply to the Middle East?

The Saudi-led
Sunni conservative camp

Saudi Arabia has emerged from the past four years relatively unscathed.
There were hopes of a possible “Saudi Spring”, however these hopes have been
crushed.

The Kingdom has actually emerged as a bastion of regional anti-revolutionary
activity, as it supported the Egyptian military in its bid to maintain power
and crush the revolution. The Kingdom led regional efforts, followed by the
United Arab Emirates, to pump needed capital into the Egyptian economy, which
is directly dominated by the military. In effect, this has allowed the Egyptian
military to consolidate its grip on the country.

The Kingdom also followed an active and aggressive foreign policy in
terms of intervening in neighboring states, especially if Shia elements are
involved in an internal struggle. The first of such interventions was in
Bahrain, now in Yemen, where Egypt and other junior allies are set to play prominent
roles.

Based on this, one could argue that Saudi Arabia has become the most
important power in the Sunni Arab World. The Kingdom has managed to accomplish
this by ensuring a decline in its prospective competitors’ powers and their dependence
on Saudi support to keep revolution at bay. As such, the only possible competitor
was Egypt, which has been significantly weakened due to the revolution and become
even more dependent on Saudi aid and international support to survive.

The Iranian camp

The same dynamic is visible in Iran. Iran through a careful and long-term
policy of cultivating allies, combined with the folly of the United States and
the Arab Revolt, has been able to amplify its influence in the Arab World. 

Iran has long-term strategic relationships with “radical” movements
and regimes in the region, which include Hamas, Hezbollah and the Syrian
regime. This has allowed it to establish deep inroads in the Arab World by not
only supporting the Shia cause, but by supporting issues that were of
significant importance for the Arab populace, namely the occupation of
Palestine, which it used skillfully to build its soft power in the region.

The US has also contributed to the expansion of Iranian power by
removing two major rivals, the Iraqi Baathist regime and the Taliban in
Afghanistan, giving Iran significant freedom of movement particularly in Iraq,
as the Iraqi polity became more sectarian. Moreover, the decline of other
regional powers made them mere proxies of Iran, most notably Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, the increasing sectarian nature of Iraqi politics, which was
culminated with the rise of ISIS, has all but led to the corrosion of the Iraqi
state, opening up the way for an expansion of Iranian influence, which in some
respects threatens to replace the state.

This is very clear in the prominent role played by Iran in the battle
for Tikrit, where Iranian backed militias played a prominent role, which in
essence negates the role of the states and destroys their monopoly on violence.
In simpler terms, the Iraqi state has become unable to protect itself and its
citizens without Iranian backing, negating the reasons for its existence.

In Syria, a similar scenario has occurred. The Assad regime has become
reliant on Iranian backing in order to remain in power. Thus, losing all
autonomy in the realm of foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, the Syrian
regime has no choice but to follow orders from Tehran.

In the middle of all this bloodshed, where is this stability predicted
by Waltz?

One needs to remember that International Relations Theory is exceptionally
Euro-centric, which explains the cultural blind spots it has. It simply ignores
the large number of regional wars, civil wars, proxy wars, coups and counter
coups, and the involvement of super powers, such as the United States, and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. Europe might have been stable, but the Third
World suffered significant losses.

Based on this, what can we reasonably expect?

One could argue that a full-scale war between the two regional powers
is neither desirable nor likely. However, a series of proxy confrontations,
that have already been taking place in countries like Syria and possibly Yemen,
are bound to follow, where both parties compete for the extension of their
hegemony over the Arab World or what is, sadly, left of it. 

This does not bode well for democratic and revolutionary movements of what
has now become the Arab Periphery. In Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Bahrain as they
find themselves pulled into this regional conflict face, not only their
oppressive governments, but also their governments’ supporters from either of
the above mentioned camps. The success of revolutionary democratic movements in
a bi-polar order will be very difficult, as attested by Mosaddegh, Allende and
Patrice Lumumba.