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Leader of Opposition, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, New Democracy, on the occasion of the 43rd anniversary of restoration of Democracy at the Presidential Palace in Athens, Greece on Monday, July 24, 2017. NurPhoto/Press Association. All rights reserved.Greece has had more than its
fair share of European and international headlines during the past years of
crisis and austerity. Whether it was a looming bankruptcy, another bailout
programme, mass protests or the complete realignment of its political system,
commentators around the world were quick to catch up with developments in the
sunny corner of the Mediterranean.
But the last couple of years have
seemed rather ‘quiet,’ giving the impression that not much is happening any more
in the austerity-ridden country. Greece seems to have left deficits behind, with
the economy
slowly growing again, while EU Summits and Eurogroup sessions have lost
their thriller-like character, reaching one positive resolution after the other
on the country’s third adjustment programme anticipated to conclude in the
summer of 2018.
Yet, someone taking a closer
look at Greece nowadays will soon notice that the climate in the public sphere has
become extremely polarised if not toxic. And it is not just the SYRIZA-led
government to blame for this newfound toxicity. To be sure, both SYRIZA and
ANEL, the two unlikely partners in government, have consistently pursued
sharply antagonistic strategies, both while in opposition and after ascending
to power in 2015, tirelessly attacking their political opponents who they
depict as the ‘old party establishment.’
Not surprisingly, their
populist character has often concerned analysts and commentators who speculate
on the possible consequences for Greece’s liberal institutions, minority
rights, the economy, etc. Nowadays it is also (if
not mostly) the centre-right opposition that has violently pushed the debate
towards extreme polarisation and political enmity.
But nowadays it is also (if
not mostly) the centre-right opposition that has violently pushed the debate
towards extreme polarisation and political enmity, feeding the public sphere
with conspiracy theories, nationalist stereotypes, and even threatening that
they will ‘crush’
or ‘skin’ (!) their
political opponents and the PM himself.
And the reason behind this furious
and indeed violent tirade? The fact is that several among New Democracy’s (ND)
top officials have recently been involved in allegations
about the so-called ‘Novartis scandal.’ The case started to unfold after FBI
investigations into the big pharmaceutical industry that were taken up by Greek
corruption prosecutors in late 2016. Details soon leaked to the media and from
there into parliamentary debate. Anonymous protected witnesses have reported in
their testimonies that several former ministers from ND and PASOK and even two
Prime Ministers have
accepted bribes from Novartis in exchange for ‘special treatment.’
Regardless of whether the
allegations prove true or false, the practices of big pharma seem to have
resulted in losses
of billions for the Greek economy, at a time when the majority of the
people have had to endure severe cuts in pensions, salaries and welfare.
In this article I am not going
to deal with the ongoing investigations into the alleged ‘scandal.’ In no
position to have an informed opinion on the involvement of senior officials in
the case, I do firmly believe that anyone under such serious accusation should
be considered innocent until proven guilty – a stance sadly not respected by
several senior members of the Greek government.
What I want to discuss is rather
the turn of the main opposition party of Greece, ND, to the right, as well as
its extremely polarising communicative strategy, one that draws on moralistic divisiveness
and nationalist rhetoric, while attacking independent institutions like the
judiciary. This strategy that has been presided over by its hard-right vice
president Adonis Georgiadis (a politician notorious in the past for his anti-Semitic
and racist views) and the ex-PM Antonis Samaras (whom on several occasions
has chosen to wage war against ‘illegal immigrants’).
This path is leading ND in the
opposite direction from what analysts and commentators expected when they saw
the rather ‘technocratic’ and mild, Kyriakos Mitsotakis rise to the party leadership
in 2016. Then, the party was expected to consolidate its profile as a centrist,
liberal and uncompromisingly Europeanist political force. The past few months
have confirmed that this is not the case. Past
months have witnessed more indications of a shift to the right as the new
leader of the party has found himself supporting or opposing policies that
contradict his liberal profile.
But this shift to the right
did not come out of the blue. On the contrary, signs that a centrist turn would
be unlikely had appeared rather early on. First, immediately after his election
in the party’s leadership, Mitsotakis appointed Adonis Georgiadis, a representative of
the hard-right faction of the party, former MP of the radical
right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and one of the most controversial
politicians in the Greek parliament, as one of his vice presidents. Georgiadis
is known for his constant presence on TV channels and his loud eccentric style,
as well as for hosting a TV-sales programme selling books and sometimes obscure
products like a ‘nanobionic’ vest with supposedly therapeutic properties. His
flamboyant personality and vitriolic attacks on opponents have often shadowed ND’s
president and PM-in-waiting, setting the tone for the party’s public presence.
Adonis Georgiadis, Vice President of New Democracy party and deputy, during the session of Hellenic Parliament, August 2017. Dimitrios Karvountzis/ Press Association. All rights reserved.Past months have witnessed
more indications of a shift to the right as the new leader of the party has
found himself supporting or opposing policies that contradict his liberal
profile. For example, in October 2017, and despite Mitsotakis’ earlier pledges,
ND
opposed the legal recognition of gender identity, finding itself siding
with the Greek Orthodox Church and the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. The bill was also
voted down by SYRIZA’s right-wing partner, ANEL, but passed with votes from the
centre and centre-left (Potami and Pasok).
Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA MPs
spoke that day in parliament on the need to expand the rights of the
marginalised and ‘invisibles,’ advocating a politics of inclusion and
tolerance. Mitsotakis, on the other side, responded by referring to a story
about a teenager who had allegedly decided to change
his gender after discussing this with an extra-terrestrial on a mountain
near Athens. The point he wanted to make was that people at the age of 15 are
too immature to decide on their gender. Leaving the absurdity of the story aside,
this argument ridiculed the right of transgender people to self-identify as
they wish, while ND’s choice to oppose the bill went against the decision of
the Court of Athens and defied calls by human rights organisations like Amnesty
International.
A few months later, Greece’s
dispute with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on its name
would – after a decade – return to the limelight due to the resuming of
negotiations between the two countries. This was facilitated by a change of
government in FYROM, which now had a moderate social-democrat politician as
Prime Minister. Zoran Zaev has consistently opposed the nationalism and irredentism
of his predecessors and is advocating a swift solution to the name dispute towards
the consolidation of a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with Greece.
The leadership of the Greek
foreign affairs ministry proceeded in a decisive yet conservative manner,
picking up the negotiations from where its predecessors had left them. They adopted
the position that the solution to the dispute should entail ‘a compound name with a
geographical qualifier before the word “Macedonia”, which will be used in
relation to everyone (erga omnes), for all uses domestic and international.’ This had been supported by ND in the past and by former PM
Kostas Karamanlis when the party was in power (2004-2009). Such a position is also
a retreat from the views that several key members of SYRIZA had previously expressed
in favour of recognising the country by its constitutional name, the name by
which it is known and referred in most of the world: simply Macedonia. Prominent members of the Greek Orthodox Church were at
the very centre of the rallies, which were also embraced by the neo-Nazi Golden
Dawn.
Reactions from
ultranationalist, religious and extreme-right groups against any solution that
would include the word ‘Macedonia’ soon started to gain traction. And while ND seemed
at first ambivalent towards these mobilisations, it soon ended up supporting
them. The two
rallies that took place in Thessaloniki and Athens were expressions of pure
nationalist pathos with alarming authoritarian, racist and anti-democratic
elements.
At centre stage in
Thessaloniki one could find a former general as well as high ranking ex-military
officers, speaking about the defence of the nation’s ‘soul,’ advocating drastic
solutions against the ‘traitors’ of the nation, even implying the possibility
of a coup against the government.
Prominent members of the Greek
Orthodox Church were at the very centre of the rallies, which were also embraced
by the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Instead of condemning such alarming phenomena, or
at least keeping some distance, the leadership of ND accused Tsipras and his
government of not being able to listen to the people’s ‘patriotic
sensitivities.’ And with negotiations between Greece and FYROM still
ongoing, ND now looks as if it will do whatever it can to undermine a solution
to the ageing and counterproductive dispute between the two countries.
Like usually happens with
perfect storms, the ‘Novartis scandal’ emerged in headlines immediately after
the nationalist rally in the centre of Athens. This was an issue with a recurring
presence in the media for more than a year, but this time the names of former
senior officials that were involved in the investigations were revealed to the
public.
The immediate reaction of ND
along with that of prominent politicians of PASOK, like former deputy PM
Evangelos Venizelos, was to claim that this was all ‘a villainous scheme’ of
the government, a conspiracy of the PM himself, who, along with members of his
cabinet had manipulated the judiciary and even guided the testimonies of
anonymous witnesses to politically ‘assassinate’ the government’s opponents.
The protected witnesses were vehemently
attacked by ND and PASOK as ‘slanderers,’ ‘dark figures’ or ‘hooded
individuals’ and were openly threatened that soon they would ‘pay’ for involving
them in their testimonies (‘they will not
be protected forever’ was the threatening warning by one of the leading
figures of the opposition, while another stated that he would ‘break the hands’ of anyone that touches
ND). (‘They
will not be protected forever’ was the threatening warning by one of the
leading figures of the opposition, while another stated that he would ‘break the hands’ of anyone that touches
ND.)
Former PM Samaras went a step
further and filed a lawsuit against PM Tsipras, Alternate Minister on
Corruption Dimitris Papaggelopoulos, but also against the chief prosecutor for
corruption and the witnesses that are under protection. In the meantime, the
Greek parliament was agreeing to form a committee tasked with investigating the
involvement of senior officials in the case. Samaras, in his speech
during parliamentary debate, did not just defend himself against allegations
involving his name in briberies, but seized the opportunity to attack the SYRIZA-led
government on its many alleged ‘crimes.’ Among the allegations, one stands out
for its severity, conspirational and indeed xenophobic tone. The ‘crime’ of SYRIZA
according to Samaras is the following:
‘The opening of the borders in 2015; [the borders]
that we had closed and which you opened in collaboration with various NGOs of
human smugglers – and you’ve let into [Greece] one million and a half of
illegal immigrants!’
There are so many things that
feel wrong in this statement, but let me just highlight the more obvious ones:
(1) the severe refugee crisis of 2015 is not acknowledged, it is as if the unprecedented
flows of people from Syria and the Middle East to Europe were a result of SYRIZA’s
open border policy, as if there was never was a war in the region; (2) refugees,
asylum seekers and economic immigrants are not recognised as such, but all are
reduced to ‘illegal immigrants’ (a
derogatory and offensive expression now banned in major news
agencies and explicitly
avoided by EU institutions); (3) humanitarian NGOs that played a key role
in saving lives across the Aegean and sheltering refugees and immigrants are
presented as the agents of human smugglers; (4) the government appears to have ‘let
into’ the country one million and a half ‘illegal immigrants’ – a hugely exaggerated number of the
refugees and immigrants currently living in Greece (estimated at around
60,000).
In other words, the former PM
and leading figure of ND seems to have fully embraced the incendiary anti-immigrant
and xenophobic rhetoric of Europe’s radical and extreme right and of people
like Marine Le Pen or Geert Wilders. Quite interestingly, no one in or around
the party has reacted against this. What is more, the silence of Greek liberal-centrist
and moderate intellectuals in front of Samaras’ anti-immigrant rant could not
be more striking. What is more, the silence of
Greek liberal-centrist and moderate intellectuals in front of Samaras’
anti-immigrant rant could not be more striking.
In this context, it is not an
exaggeration to say that the conservative opposition’s presence in the Greek public
sphere during the past months has been fuelling bitter confrontations, creating
the conditions for the further alienation of citizens not just from the
political system and parliamentary politics, but also from the institutions
that safeguard liberties and the rule of law.
In other words, ND’s new
polarising strategy is not just leading to the further moralisation of
politics, it is also spreading a culture of conspiracy mongering and is
severely discrediting the judiciary system of Greece as well as the government
itself as an institution.
Even if in the end investigations
on the Novartis case by the authorities proceed in a paradigmatic and ethically
flawless way, closing the case, the fact that on an almost daily basis there
are high-profile politicians of ND and PASOK in the media, advocating that
prosecutors are merely puppets in the hands of a ‘corrupt government,’ has
already caused severe damage to the image of the judiciary and the political
system as a whole.
Add to this the fact that within
the past few weeks ND has not hesitated to use the foreign relations of Greece,
and more specifically recent tensions with Turkey in the Aegean
Sea and Evros
border, as a means to attack the government, and one can easily see the
possibility of polarisation escalating further, with consequences reaching beyond
Greek borders.
A sceptical observer might suggest
that I am over-stressing the negative effects of the Greek opposition’s current
stance on a series of issues. That I am ignoring the fact that in such
situations ‘it takes two to tango.’
Indeed, the sitting government
in Greece, a coalition
of a populist radical left and a populist-nationalist right party, is no
stranger to polarisation. It actually rose to power by mainly following an ‘us
versus them’ campaign, rallying its supporters against the parties of the
‘old establishment,’ pledging to put an end to austerity and to radically renew
the political system.
In practice, after immense
pressure, it has chosen to sign yet another new bailout programme, following
the dictates of its EU partners and lenders in most policy areas, thus furthering
austerity.
Now, if one judges by the reactions
of top EU officials, it seems that the SYRIZA-led government has carried out
most of the agreed structural reforms in a rather effective way. As for the ‘liberal’
component of democracy in Greece, which various commentators had considered under
threat, one could point to several ambiguous tendencies, but it is obvious that
there have not been any major setbacks.
On the one hand, there have
been positive developments on various fronts, especially if we take into
account the several bills passed to recognise and consolidate the rights of
ethnic minorities and immigrants as well as the rights of the LGBTQ community.
On the other hand, it is a
fact that the current government has not kept the institutional distance that
it should from cases like the Novartis case, discussed above. Instead of
leaving the prosecutors to do their job independently and respecting the
presumed innocence of the senior officials under investigation, ministers were
quick to state that this is the ‘biggest scandal’
from the very foundation of Greece as an independent state.
In this sense, the government
did not respect the independence of the judiciary to the extent that it should
have. Moreover, it has used the case as an opportunity to attack and discredit its
political opponents.
But I have chosen to focus more
on the other side here, that of the centre-right (and centre-left) ‘moderate’
opposition in Greece. On the forces that have very often been uncritically portrayed
as the ‘liberal’ Europeanist pole of the Greek political system.
And I am doing this for a
specific reason. The point I want to make is that things are not as simple and
tidy as often presented by mainstream media, popular academics and pundits: it
is not just the ‘illiberal’ populists
against the ‘liberal’ moderates.
It is not necessarily the former
that are threatening institutions, checks and balances, the rule of law,
democratic culture and so on, against the latter, the enlightened forces of
political moderation and liberal consensus that safeguard democratic values and
institutions. The dynamics of the political game in Greece – as in Europe and
beyond – are increasingly much more complex.
Both ‘sides’ have at times articulated
their politics in ways that have been more or less liberal, more or less
‘responsible,’ and indeed more or less transparent or democratic. But while commentators
around Europe are always quick to join the fight against the alleged ‘populists,’
and even write articles advising the ‘liberals’ (as if they were a coherent
camp) on how
to defeat them (as if all populists are the same and should all be defeated), what is often ignored is the mainstreaming of nationalism and nativism,
the legitimization of illiberal and indeed of anti-democratic ideas and
practices by established ‘moderate’ political forces. What
is often ignored is the mainstreaming
of nationalism and nativism, the legitimization of illiberal and indeed of
anti-democratic ideas and practices by established ‘moderate’ political forces.
Take for example the adoption
of a strong anti-immigrant rhetoric by the People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD) and PM Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, who in their effort to
defeat Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the recent general election, ended
up legitimising his agenda and mainstreaming islamophobia in a country that has
a long tradition of openness and tolerance. Or, even worse, the hard shift of
the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) to the right, that under Sebastian Kurz in
now governing in coalition with the radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ),
appointing its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache as vice chancellor. Not many
years ago, such collaborations in government would cause severe reactions from
other governments and intellectuals across Europe. Today, this is almost becoming
the ‘new normal.’
Greece’s centre-right seems to
be moving on a similar path to some of its European counterparts. And given
that ND could win the next general election, this might have significant
consequences for the country. In such a scenario, we could see ND’s trumpesque vice president, who constantly
threatens to ‘crush,’ ‘obliterate’ or jail his political opponents, as a deputy
PM or leading a key ministry. This would not be good news for Greece and its
democratic institutions, nor for Europe. But it does not make any headlines.
Nobody considers such a politician a ‘threat’ like they considered, for
example, Tsipras or Pablo Iglesias not so long ago. In this sense, it seems
that demands to reverse austerity or to even slightly deviate from Europe’s
fiscal orthodoxy is a far more dangerous idea than targeting immigrants,
fuelling nationalist sentiments or attacking the judiciary and protected whistleblowers.
It seems that demands to reverse austerity or to
even slightly deviate from Europe’s fiscal orthodoxy is a far more dangerous
idea than targeting immigrants, fuelling nationalist sentiments or attacking
the judiciary and protected whistleblowers.
To be sure, post-Brexit Europe
is facing many challenges. The consolidation of illiberal authoritarian parties
in specific countries (e.g. Hungary, Poland), as well as the further
empowerment of the populist radical right in others (e.g. France, Italy), are
definitely among the most serious ones.
But the story does not stop
there. Democratic institutions and ideas as well as the prospects of creating
an open, diverse and tolerant society are also threatened by the mainstreaming
of nationalist/nativist, authoritarian and anti-democratic ideas as expressed
by established political forces.
Mainstream media and
commentators tend to ignore this, often creating the picture of a unified and
embattled moderate ‘centre’ that is defending Europe and liberal democracy
against anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and the left. But
what was considered ‘moderate’ or ‘mainstream’ in the past has been changing,
with the centre-right coming alarmingly closer to the radical right, especially
on issues related to immigration and the ‘law and order’ agenda.
We need to acknowledge this
and to critically discuss the possible consequences of this broader shift. At
the same time, we need to reflect upon the very state of liberal democracy
itself and on its postdemocratic
tendencies, overcoming convenient yet counterproductive dichotomies such as
‘populism vs. liberalism,’ ‘rationalism vs. irrationalism,’ and so on and so
forth.
The much-needed reinvigoration
of democracy does not necessarily pass through ‘more liberalism’ or ‘more
Europe.’ Democracy can (and should) become more inclusive, more participatory,
more deliberative, more redistributive, more passionate, and in some respects
even more populist – building on
constructive agonistic confrontation, holding unresponsive elites accountable,
taking collective identities seriously, bringing the demands of the
marginalised and disenfranchised to the fore.