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Egypt’s faltering counter-insurgency strategy

Egyptian security forces block the road at the site about 35 km away from where policemen were killed in a shootout in Giza, Egypt, Oct. 21, 2017. Ahmed Gomaa/Xinhua News Agency/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.In a devastating blow
to Egypt’s counter insurgency efforts, 54 members of the security forces were reported
killed during a security operation in the Farafra Oasis on 21 October. This
oasis located a mere 135 km south-west of Cairo.

The exact number of
those killed remains unknown. The interior ministry issued an official
statement claiming that only 16 police offers had been killed, whereas security
officials initially stated that 59 had been killed. The Egyptian government criticized
international media for inflating the number of causalities.

At first the government
held the Hassm group responsible; a group it claims is the armed wing of the Muslim
Brotherhood – even though the Brotherhood has denied the claims. It remains
unclear until now who is responsible for the ambush; no concrete evidence of Hassm
responsibility has been provided – even though a fabricated claim has been circulating – and more recently
a new group Ansar El-Islam, who are allegedly connected to Al Qaeda, have
claimed responsibility.

A deeper analysis of
this recent security blunder reveals both operational as well as political
failures in handling an increasingly deadly insurgency which has claimed the
lives of hundreds of members of the security forces.

According to Mostafa
Bakry, a pro-regime parliamentarian, a security operation was initiated from a tip off that an insurgent cell was
hiding in the Western Desert. However, when security forces went to this
location, the insurgents had prior warning and ambushed the security forces,
causing heavy causalities.

The insurgents’ ability
to counter the security forces and obtain advance knowledge of their movement
raises the specter of security leaks and the infiltration of the security apparatus.

Ahmed Mansour,
the ex-head of the police academy, claimed that “treason” was an integral part
of this security blunder. It is not the first time that the Egyptian security
apparatus has been subjected to infiltration; the most infamous example was that
of Wilayat Sinai when they managed to bypass security and plant
a bomb inside a Russian chartered aircraft in October 2015 killing all 224
passengers.

On the operational
side, there are a number of signs of systematic failures. For example, one of
the reasons cited by the authorities for the abysmal performance of the
security forces is the lack of air support and proper reconnaissance before the operation. The
commanding officer was unable to call for reinforcement due to poor telecommunications.

This was compounded by
the insurgent’s intimate knowledge of the terrain, a lack of investment in topographical
training and rudimentary counter-insurgency equipment – such as, satellite
based equipment that is essential in operations in remote parts of the country
–  and poor recruitment practices.

The strategy of the
Egyptian government has been to heavily invest in the purchase of traditional
heavy weaponry, such as the 11.9 billion dollars in 2015, with little investment in equipment
that is better suited for conducting counter insurgency operations.

The location of the
operation also highlights the Egyptian government’s counter-insurgency strategy
failure. For unlike the insurgency in Sinai, which is far from the political
and economic center of the country, this operation was a mere 135 KM from the
capital.

If there is a new
group that is capable of delivering such a painful blow to the security forces
so close to the capital, then there are higher chances of sophisticated terror
operations taking place in the capital.

On the political level
the regime reacted in an atypical manner, which is an indication of the size of
the blunder as well as the weakening of the appeal of the “war on terror”
rhetoric.

Unlike on other
occasions when these incidents were exploited, this time the regime attempted to
create a façade of normalcy with President Sisi participating the following day
in celebrations for the anniversary of the battle of El Alamein, not making
any public announcements about the ambush.

In terms of government
controlled media, the level of reporting was rather slim, as the regime
attempted to suppress and control the narrative. Interestingly, Ahmed Moussa, a talk show host and one of the most ardent
supporters of the regime had his show suspended after having reported casualty
figures that contradicted those of the government in addition to having conducted
interviews with some of the survivors in which harrowing tales of the assault
were relayed that exposed the ineptness of the security forces.

The Egyptian regime
has systematically failed to counter the deadly insurgency that has been
growing in the country. There is a lack of preparedness and investment in
countering the insurgency and the wave of repression has not lead to an
improved security situation, on the contrary, Cairo is now more of a target to
insurgents.

One of the most
notable examples of suppression of independent voices was the arrest of Ismail El Iskandarani, an independent
researcher who was one of the first to highlight the role Hisham Ashmawi, an ex-special forces
officer, was playing in the evolving insurgency in Sinai. Iskandarani was also critical
of the ineffective counter-insurgency strategy of the military.

It seems that this
security blunder and the repeated failure of the regime in tackling the
insurgency is becoming a source of embarrassment. This is a regime that has
been justifying its campaign of mass repression with security threats and the
fight against terror. The regime will no longer be able to use the “war on
terror” rhetoric as a tool to solicit popular support for its repressive
policies.

Unless there are deep
reforms, one can only expect that the insurgency will become more deadly.